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Avian Cognition: Understanding Tool UseAlthough rooks are considered non-tool-using animals, a recent study
has shown that they learn to solve a ‘trap-tube’ task faster than many
tool-using primates, raising questions about the evolution of
sophisticated physical cognition.Jackie Chappell
Ever since we discovered that
Homo sapiens is not, as we once
fondly imagined, the only tool user
in the animal kingdom, we have
been fascinated by animal tool use.
There has been an intense debate
between those who believe that
animals do not understand the
physical principles and causal
regularities that underlie tool use as
we do, and those who believe that
the difference is a quantitative,
rather than a qualitative one (an
idea expressed by Darwin as
‘mental continuity’ between
humans and ‘higher animals’ [1]).
Certainly, no non-human animal
uses tools which have anything like
the complexity and variety of those
employed by modern humans. On
the other hand, do we humans
always understand the principles
behind the operation of the tools
that we use? And is an
understanding of the physicaldomain and of causality an
adaptation specific to tool users, or
might the behavioural flexibility
that it brings also endow non-tool
users with selective advantages?
The ‘trap-tube’ task [2] has been
a popular and useful assay of the
extent of physical cognition —
specifically, an understanding of
the operation of gravity — in both
humans and non-human animals.
The principle behind the test is
simple: food or another desirable
item is placed inside a horizontal
tube which has a vertical, blind-
ended tube attached to it. Subjects
must push (or pull) the item from
the appropriate end of the tube
using a stick, so that they do not
lose the item in the trap. Subjects
are assessed on how quickly they
learn to avoid the trap, but the
critical test involves inverting the
tube so that the trap is now on the
top, and seeing if subjects now
disregard the position of the trap
when choosing an action. Therationale is that, if they understand
that unsupported items fall under
gravity, they will also understand
that an inverted trap cannot
endanger the item.
But this design has a number of
conceptual flaws [3]. As there is no
penalty for continuing to use the
rules that were successful during
training, there is no incentive to
alter the behaviour, though this
does not mean that the subjects
have not understood the task.
Similarly, animals might pass the
test without understanding the
action of gravity if the visual
differences between the normal
and inverted tubes mean that they
regard them as entirely different
tasks. Furthermore, many animals
have performed rather poorly on
the task [2], and even humans fail
to respond randomly when the
trap is inverted under a variety of
conditions [3], suggesting that
there are methodological
problems with the test. Thus, as
they report this issue of Current
Biology, Seed et al. [4] re-designed
the experiment so that the critical
test was a transfer task rather
than a test in which a null
response was critical (see
Figure 1).
Seed et al. [4] and Tebbich et al.
[5] found that non-tool-using rooks
(Corvus frugilegus) learned the
modified task in fewer trials than
many of the other species which
have been tested. Furthermore, all
seven of the rooks passed the
transfer test, in which some of the
stimuli changed, and one bird
passed two further transfer tests in
which there were no shared visual
stimuli with the training tasks [4].
This tentatively suggests the
possibility that at least one rook
was able to extract some causal
regularities — rather than
perceptual similarities — from
the apparatus to solve the task.
But what exactly did this rook
understand? Did she understand
that unsupported objects fall
under gravity, or that objects
can be moved smoothly alongFigure 1. The modified trap-tube task.
From this position, the rook must pull the stick to make the food drop out of the non-
functional trap on the right of the photograph, rather than be trapped in the functional
trap on the left.
Polyploid Hybrids: Multiple Origins
of a Treefrog Species
Hyla versicolor, a tetraploid treefrog, is reported to have originated
via multiple hybridization events involving three diploid ancestors. Its
complex reticulate history provides insights into the roles that
polyploidy and hybridization can play in the origin of species.
Robert C. Vrijenhoek
The roles that polyploidy and
hybridization play in the origin of
plant and animal species have
been discussed for many years.
The two processes often occur
together in the form of
allopolyploids — hybrids with two
or more copies of each parental
genome — but each process can
be viewed separately, because
many polyploids are not hybrids
and vice versa. The appearance of
polyploids, a form of instantaneous
speciation, is common in seed
plants and ferns [1]. Nevertheless,
Stebbins [2] argued that polyploidy
Dispatch
R245a continuous path? Whatever
the nature of this understanding,
there seem to be large individual
variations, because only three
of seven rooks in Tebbich
et al. [5] solved the training
task, and none passed the
transfer task.
There has been a tendency to try
to fit animals’ cognitive abilities
into one of two categories: either
they exhibit abilities equivalent (or
nearly so) to those of humans, or
their abilities are based on
associative learning, and are
therefore somewhat inflexibly
tied to the specific stimuli used
during training. The real situation
is likely to be much more
complicated than this, and the
details of what is and what is not
understood, and how those differ
between species and between
tasks are fascinating. The striking
inter-individual differences [4,5]
also suggest that genetic or
developmental conditions might
also play an important role in
determining the details of adult
cognitive abilities.
But how is information about
physical causality acquired? The
causal structure of the world
cannot be perceived directly — you
cannot ‘see’ gravity — and must be
inferred from the spatio-temporal
relationships between objects. One
suggestion is that natural selection
has equipped some species with
a theory-generating mechanism
which uses the conditional
probabilities between causes and
outcomes to assign causality [6].
For example, if X and Y together are
always followed by event Z, but Y
alone is not followed by Z, X must
be the cause of Z. Non-human
animals can make some of these
inferences through associative
learning [7], and there is evidence
that even very young children are
capable of quite complex and
subtle forms this kind of reasoning
[8]. Furthermore, work by Schultz
and Gopnik [9] has suggested that
young children perform
interventions or experiments when
investigating the cause of an event,
in order to falsify hypotheses about
causes.
There is, however, another
possibility; not all causes are
equally plausible as explanations
of outcomes, because of theconstraints of the physical world.
Animals with certain expectations
about the way that the world works
would be able to narrow the field of
candidate causes substantially,
because some causes are simply
‘impossible’. We know, for
example, that very young children
understand that solid objects will
not pass through solid barriers [10].
Knowledge about rigid objects
would allow an organism to predict
that, if it moved the nearest side of
an object, the far side would move
away an equal distance. By
violating these putative
expectations, and observing what
animals anticipate happening, we
can explore what those
expectations might be.
The experiments reported by
Seed et al. [4] also point out the
importance of designing
ethologically valid tasks when
investigating cognitive capabilities.
In this case, the fact that the animal
is able to pull the food towards
itself seems to enable it to perform
at a much higher level, perhaps
because each stage of the action
brings the food closer rather than
pushing it further away. Also,
details of exactly what animals can
and cannot do are more
illuminating than the presence or
absence of a particular response.
The world is a bewilderingly
complex place for young
organisms, and we need to think
much more about the ways in
which information about thephysical world is structured and
acquired.
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